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President Zuma and Ministers and others who have spoken out following the departure 
of President Al-Bashir from South 
Africa despite a High Court order 
that he should be held “pending a 
formal request for his surrender from 
the International Criminal Court” 
are neither naïve nor illiterate. They 
understand the constitution and the 
legislation, the implications of their 
decision to defy the order, and they 
also understand the implications of 
their responses to the criticism which 
has followed.
Their response is significant: little 
effort has been made to criticise the 
High Court’s decisions in the terms 
in which they were made – that is, 
confined to the law which the Court 
was restricted to.
It is wrong to characterise the 
situation as a clash between the 
judiciary and the legislature. In fact, 
the tension is between the State as 
established under the Constitution and 
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as represented by the judges, and a 
political party which happens for the 
moment to constitute the government. 
It is irrelevant that it may or may not 
be re-elected – the Constitution, its 
conventions and the law endure to be 
respected across any such changes, 
and the Constitution itself is designed 
to ensure that the judiciary cannot 
compete for power as if it were a 
political party. For example, the 
manner in which judges are appointed 
and their long tenure (to a maximum of 
age 70) are designed to remove them 
from the sphere of political activism 
in civil society and to protect their 
independence. By design, they outlive 
any government under which they 
were appointed.
This is underlined by the 
“Statement”, issued on 8 July 2015 by 
the Chief Justice and Heads of Court 
and Senior Judges of all Divisions, on 
the judiciary’s commitment to the rule 
of law following the defiance of the 
order of court that Al-Bashir should 
be held. One paragraph reads: “Our 
constitution, like others of its kind, 
sets out the powers of each arm of 
state. No arm of the state is entitled to 
intrude upon the domain of the other. 
However, the constitution requires 
the Judiciary ultimately to determine 
the limits and regulate the exercise of 
public power”.
The statement by Lindiwe Zulu, 
the Minister for Small Business 
Development, provides evidence 
that the clash is between the state 
and the Zuma administration. She 
told parliament that the decision to 
let Al-Bashir leave the country was “a 
collective cabinet decision”. Putting 
justice ahead of all other elements‚ she 
claimed‚ was “counter-productive”. 
Subsequently, she told Parliament 
during a debate on President Zuma’s 
fitness for office because of this 
decision, that a motion to investigate 
and to consider the matter was aimed 
at discrediting the ANC.
Defending the decision to defy the 
order of court John Jeffrey (the Deputy 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development), Jeff Radebe (the 
Minister in the Office of the 
Presidency), and other commentators, 
have claimed that the effect of the 
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Al-Bashir was not 
in South Africa as an 
accredited diplomat in 
the Sudanese mission 
but as Head of State 
for the purposes of the 
AU Convention which, 
unlike the Rome 
Statute, has not been 
enacted to be a part  
of South African  
law.
Act (the “Immunities Act”) is to 
protect Al-Bashir from being detained. 
Jeffrey also drew attention to cases 
involving the extradition of the dictator 
Augusto Pinochet to stand trial in the 
UK, claiming that these showed that 
international law protects sitting heads 
of state by granting absolute immunity 
when they visit other countries on 
official business. He also said:
It is interesting to note that 
Nigeria, when President Al-Bashir 
visited Nigeria in July 2013, also 
did not arrest him and the ICC 
subsequently absolved Nigeria of 
liability for the failure of its security 
forces to arrest, as the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC ruled that 
Nigeria	has	justifiable	reasons	for	its	
failure to arrest President Al-Bashir.
It has also been claimed that 
Article 98 of the Rome Statute is in 
contradiction to Article 27, which 
denies immunity to heads of state from 
the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Examining these claims one at a 
time, a different picture emerges.
Firstly, the Diplomatic Immunities 
and Privileges Act, which came into 
effect in February 2002, makes no 
reference to the ICC whatever. The 
long title to the Act states that its 
purpose is:
To make provision regarding 
the immunities and privileges of 
diplomatic missions and consular 
posts and their members, of heads 
of states, special envoys and certain 
representatives,	 of	 the	 United	
Nations, and its specialised agencies, 
and other international organisations 
and of certain other persons; to make 
provision regarding immunities and 
privileges pertaining to international 
conferences and meetings; to enact 
into law certain conventions; and 
to provide for matters connected 
therewith.
Sec. 2 enacts into South African 
law the Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the United 
Nations, 1946, the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the 
Specialised Agencies, 1947, the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
1961, and the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations, 1963. The 
Immunities Act thus brings South Africa 
into line with universally-observed rules 
which enable every state’s accredited 
diplomats to do their tasks in the foreign 
countries where they are sent. Sec. 4 
states that “A head of state is immune 
from the criminal and civil jurisdiction 
of the courts of the Republic”. This is 
why, for example, diplomats can claim 
to be protected from prosecution in 
South Africa even for traffic offences, 
but neither the Conventions nor the 
Immunities Act have anything to do 
with cases before the International 
Criminal Court, and they were never 
intended to provide immunity from 
its jurisdiction. The Immunities Act is 
valueless to defend the failure to hold 
Al-Bashir, because the only immunity 
conferred is in relation to South African 
courts.
A fundamental rule for the 
interpretation of statutes is that when 
passing a law which has the effect of 
amending an existing law, it is assumed 
that Parliament intended to make that 
change or amendment. Article 27 of 
the Rome Statute Treaty states:
This Statute shall apply equally to 
all persons without any distinction 
based	 on	 official	 capacity.	 In	
particular,	official	capacity	as	a	Head	
of State or Government, a member 
of a Government or parliament, 
an elected representative or a 
government	official	 shall	 in	no	case	
exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, nor 
shall it, in and of itself, constitute a 
ground for reduction of sentence.
The Gauteng High Court pointed 
out that the African Union Convention 
has not been enacted as a part of South 
African law. The Immunities Act does 
not do this, it is therefore not binding 
in South Africa, and so the “structures, 
staff and personnel of the AU” do not 
automatically enjoy privileges and 
immunity in South Africa. Accordingly, 
only as a head of state or in terms of 
the agreement between South Africa 
and the African Union Commission 
which purported to grant immunity 
for the purposes of the AU summit, 
could Al-Bashir enjoy immunity. The 
first ground failed because the Rome 
Statute (and Article 27 in particular) 
is a part of South African law, and the 
second also failed because the AU 
Convention is not.
Secondly, the cases involving 
Pinochet which were cited by Jeffrey 
predate the Rome Statute. South 
Africa signed this in 2000; it came 
into force as international law in 
August 2002; and it became the law 
of South Africa, also in August 2002, 
by the Implementation of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal 
Court Act (the “Implementation” Act). 
The Rome Statute and South Africa’s 
Implementation Act have thus changed 
totally the pre-existing international 
law governing the immunity of heads 
of state, and it was intended that they 
should do so. Here too, the Pinochet 
cases referred to by Jeffrey are no 
authority.
The cases cited by Jeffrey most 
certainly stated customary international 
law as it was when they were decided, 
and by our Constitution that law and 
the doctrine of immunity were once 
the law of South Africa. However, 
this was before the Rome Statute was 
passed and re-enacted as South African 
law, changing both international law 
and South African law.
But is it now seriously contended 
that those who negotiated and drafted 
the Rome Statute were unaware of the 
changes to customary international 
law made by Article 27 of the Rome 
Statute, and did not intend them? 
Is it now seriously contended that 
the government of South Africa was 
unaware of Article 27 of the Rome 
Statute when signing it, that the 
legislature accidentally overlooked the 
Article, and did not intend to make the 
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changes to our law when it re-enacted 
the Rome Statute to be part of our 
law? Is it now seriously contended that 
our legislature was unaware that the 
Immunities Act and the Conventions 
behind it had nothing to do with the 
Rome Statute?
Why is the purported clash between 
Articles 27 and 98 only now being 
thought of? The answer to this question 
is simple: there is no clash, and when 
the Rome Statute was being enacted by 
the United Nations and by the South 
African Parliament nobody thought 
that there was one.
The long title and Preamble to the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court Act 
could not possibly be more explicit 
about what was intended, and what 
was said in the National Legislature by 
Jeffrey is simply wrong.
Ministers Jeffrey and Radebe and 
others both referred to Article 98, 
headed “Cooperation with respect 
to waiver of immunity and consent 
to surrender” of the Rome Statute as 
though it created problems for holding 
Al-Bashir.
When interpreting a statute, there 
is an assumption that a legislature will 
not contradict itself with irreconcilable 
and contradictory provisions, and 
that one should seek meanings for 
the provisions which make sense and 
make the statute enforceable. Clause 1 
of Article 98 reads:
The Court may not proceed with 
a request for surrender or assistance 
which would require the requested 
State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international 
law with respect to the State or 
diplomatic immunity of a person 
or property of a third State, unless 
the	 Court	 can	 first	 obtain	 the	
cooperation of that third State for 
the waiver of the immunity.
If one replaces the words “the 
requested State” with “South Africa”, 
and “a third State” with a generic State 
called “A”, then the text becomes clear. 
Its purpose – for example – is to deal 
with the situation where a foreigner 
whose surrender is sought by the ICC 
seeks refuge in State A or in State A’s 
Embassy in South Africa. South Africa 
has obligations to State A to respect its 
territorial integrity and its diplomatic 
immunity under international law, 
and accordingly nothing lawful can be 
done to effect the ICC’s request unless 
State A cooperates with South Africa by 
– for example – allowing South African 
authorities to enter its territory or by 
waiving the diplomatic immunity of its 
Embassy. The clause is thus irrelevant 
to the Al-Bashir matter.
Clause 2 of Article 98 reads:
The Court may not proceed with 
a request for surrender which would 
require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations 
under international agreements 
pursuant to which the consent of a 
sending State is required to surrender 
a person of that State to the Court, 
unless	the	Court	can	first	obtain	the	
cooperation of the sending State 
for the giving of consent for the 
surrender is concerned.
As one distinguished lawyer 
explains,
The expression ‘sending state’ is 
not	 defined	 in	 the	 (Rome)	 Statute	
... but is a well-known term of art 
in international law, and refers to a 
state whose armed forces or police 
or	 other	 official	 or	 government-
employed or government-contracted 
personnel are stationed or otherwise 
deployed in the territory of another 
state pursuant to some sort of 
agreement to which both states 
are parties. (Roger O’Keefe, 
International Law). 
Hence, the commonly-used term 
“mission” when referring those who 
are “stationed or otherwise deployed” 
to conduct the diplomatic affairs 
with the host state in terms of “some 
sort of agreement to which both 
states are parties”. The agreement 
determines their immunities. This 
means – for example – that, without 
Sudan’s consent, South Africa cannot 
“surrender” a Sudanese diplomat 
who is wanted by the ICC, and who 
is deployed in South Africa and 
who holds diplomatic immunity, by 
removing him from the Sudanese 
Embassy at the request of the ICC. 
Without that consent, South Africa 
would break its obligations – for 
example, by entering the Sudanese 
Embassy – under the agreement with 
Sudan in terms of which Sudan has a 
mission in South Africa. Al-Bashir was 
not in South Africa as an accredited 
diplomat in the Sudanese mission but 
as Head of State for the purposes of 
the AU Convention which, unlike the 
Rome Statute, has not been enacted 
to be a part of South African law. 
He thus enjoyed no immunity as a 
diplomat, and even as a Head of State 
any immunity he might otherwise have 
enjoyed had been nullified by Article 
27 of the Rome Statute. Accordingly, 
the whole of Article 98 of the Rome 
Statute is irrelevant to any attempt to 
justify the failure to detain Al-Bashir 
and is consistent with Article 27.
Thirdly, while it is true that the ICC 
condoned Nigeria’s failure to detain 
Al-Bashir, this was because Nigeria 
had been physically unable to do so. 
Nigeria explained that there was an AU 
Summit on health matters, to which 
Al-Bashir had not been invited but had 
“appeared ostensibly” to attend it. The 
ICC accepted the explanation that:
[t]he sudden departure of 
President Al-Bashir prior to the 
official	 end	 of	 the	 AU	 Summit	
occurred	 at	 the	 time	 that	 officials	
of relevant bodies and agencies 
of [...] Nigeria were considering 
the necessary steps to be taken 
in respect of his visit in line with 
Nigeria's international obligations...
The circumstances of Al-Bashir’s 
presence in South Africa were so 
different that the authority of the ICC’s 
decision tends to justify detaining 
Al-Bashir in South Africa, rather than 
South Africa’s failure to do so.
None of the above is arcane rocket-
science law. These matters were well-
known to the Cabinet when it decided 
to allow Al-Bashir to leave South Africa 
in defiance of the ruling of the Gauteng 
High Court.
Jeffrey and others who supported 
the political reasons for permitting 
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South Africa was  
one of the foremost 
states behind the 
Rome Statute and 
was proud to use its 
newly-won freedom to 
lead the way.
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Al-Bashir to leave have drawn attention 
to the refusal of some countries, and 
the United States in particular, to 
cooperate with the work of the ICC 
and even to hinder it.
These matters are true. However, 
were they not anticipated from the very 
outset, for the American dislike of the 
ICC was never secret? Invoking them 
now to justify South Africa’s dealing 
with Al-Bashir, and now to review South 
Africa’s cooperation with the ICC, is 
embarrassing when one considers the 
moment in history when South Africa 
became a signatory to the Rome Statute 
and enacted it as our law.
One genocidal holocaust after 
another had at last brought humanity 
to the point of creating a mechanism 
to make an end to impunity, and for 
the agonised cry, “Never again!” to 
be the new reality. South Africa was 
one of the foremost states behind the 
Rome Statute and was proud to use 
its newly-won freedom to lead the 
way. The spirit in which South Africa 
identified itself with the Rome Statute 
was carried into the firm refusal of 
South Africa to sign a Bilateral Immunity 
Agreement which would exclude US 
nationals from the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. The pressure from the United 
States for countries to sign Bilateral 
Immunity Agreements was enormous 
– quite simply blackmail, as a failure 
to agree meant an end to US aid. In 
a meticulous paper (tellingly entitled 
“The Magnificent Seven”) in the African 
Journal of Human Rights Law on the 
topic, Cotton and Odongo wrote:
Certain governments in Africa 
have declared openly that they 
believe signing a BIA would violate 
their obligations as state parties 
under the Rome Statute. This is 
especially true concerning South 
Africa, a dominant power in the 
region, which has been very vocal in 
espousing its reluctance on signing 
a BIA which it believes would 
undermine the ICC.
South Africa’s commitment to 
the ICC was a proud moment from 
the outset – a passionate reflection 
of our determination to identify 
with the highest standards in human 
rights. The “Postamble” to the interim 
constitution, sadly not included in the 
final text, spoke of it as providing – 
...a historic bridge between the 
past of a deeply divided society 
characterised	 by	 strife,	 conflict,	
untold suffering and injustice, and 
a future founded on the recognition 
of human rights, democracy 
and peaceful co-existence and 
development opportunities for 
all South Africans, irrespective of 
colour, race, class, belief or sex.
This captured the spirit of the 
moment in South Africa, and 
unqualified support for the ICC was 
the finest that South Africa could 
offer to the world. If it was right to do 
what South Africa did then, why has 
it become so wrong now that we can 
even think of withdrawing from the 
ICC?
Commentators have justly pointed 
to anomalies and problems in the work 
of the ICC. This is not the place to 
explore in depth the ugly inheritance of 
colonialism and the attempt by former 
colonial Powers to abuse the ICC for 
their own ends. Nonetheless, the 
simple question must be asked: how 
are the purposes for which the ICC was 
founded, and for which South African 
commitment was total, now advanced 
by leaving the field in ignominious 
surrender? The ICC is clearly contested 
terrain to defend and to develop, not 
to abandon.
Apparently, so far as the South 
African government is concerned, the 
Rome Statute has made no change 
in international law and practice and 
the ICC may as well never have been 
established. Why, one asks, did South 
Africa ever bother sign the Rome Statute 
and make it part of South African law? 
How does returning Al-Bashir to Sudan 
bring peace and stability to those who 
live there? How could putting a wanted 
African genocidaire into the hands 
of the International Criminal Court 
possibly leave the AU worse off? 
In her speech in the National 
Assembly, Lindiwe Zulu claimed that 
history would absolve her for claiming 
that peace and stability:
Speaker‚ this festival of 
condemnation that has arisen out 
of President Bashir’s attendance 
to	 the	 AU	 Summit	 has	 sought	 to	
impose a disjuncture between the 
attainment of peace on the one 
hand and justice on the other‚ she 
concluded. It should therefore be 
noted that our efforts for the renewal 
of the continent will remain void if 
the fundamental elements which 
include peace and stability are 
not realised. Peace and stability is 
therefore an important ingredient for 
development.
It appears that those who criticise 
South Africa’s conduct with regard to 
Al-Bashir are regarded as hampering 
South Africa’s efforts to bring about 
peace in Sudan and should still their 
voices. Sudanese victims of genocide 
should also show restraint, for 
unless they heed the South African 
government’s admonitions they will be 
the cause of their own further suffering. 
The title of a study Erin Pizzey, 
published in 1974, about violence 
against women comes to mind: Scream 
Quietly or the Neighbours Will Hear.
South Africa was a founding 
member not just of the ICC, but of 
the United Nations Organisation itself 
in 1945 – the year World War Two 
ended. If South Africa does withdraw 
from the ICC, we will have achieved 
the record of being the only state to 
sever links with the United Nations or 
one of its organs twice. The first time, 
in 1974, South Africa’s membership of 
the UN was suspended by the General 
Assembly because of apartheid; one 
wonders now how turning away 
from the ICC will be explained to the 
genocide victims in Sudan.
In terms of section 83 of the 
Constitution the President must 
“uphold, defend and respect the 
Constitution as the supreme law of 
the Republic” and he has sworn to be 
faithful to the Republic of South Africa, 
and to obey, observe, uphold and 
maintain its Constitution and all other 
law.
The Ministers who together with 
the President constitute the Cabinet 
have sworn or affirmed that they 
would “obey, respect and uphold the 
Constitution and all other law of the 
Republic” and would hold their offices 
with honour and dignity and be true 
and faithful counsellors.
Lindiwe Zulu told Parliament that 
Al-Bashir was allowed to depart from 
South Africa by a Cabinet decision. 
Why should those who have sworn 
thus not be charged with treason?
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Commentators 
have justly pointed 
to anomalies and 
problems in the 
work of the ICC. This 
is not the place to 
explore in depth the 
ugly inheritance of 
colonialism and the 
attempt by former 
colonial Powers to 
abuse the ICC for their 
own ends.
Sec . 165 of the Constitution states 
that “An order or decision issued by a 
court binds all persons to whom and 
organs of state to which it applies”. 
At the very least, why should those 
responsible as Zulu has revealed not be 
charged with contempt of court?
Casting justice aside to secure its 
own idea of “peace” and “stability” 
was exactly how the apartheid regime 
maintained itself, and at the very heart 
of our struggle for freedom was our 
belief that without justice there never 
could be peace and stability. It appears 
that the Cabinet has betrayed not only 
our country, but also the fundamental 
ethic and the very core and founding 
principle of our entire historic struggle. 
Why should those responsible not be 
charged with bringing the entire ANC 
into disrepute?
After a history of bitter injustice, we 
have written a constitution which acts 
as the touchstone of justice which we 
have defined to the highest standards 
anywhere. We have commanded 
our courts to act as our constitutional 
bodyguards and our judges have 
given the most solemn undertakings 
to be vigilant and to strike down any 
law and to condemn any conduct 
which clashes with the constitution. 
What we have done has been saluted 
across the world. If it now becomes 
established constitutional doctrine 
that justice is not necessary for “peace 
and stability”, we are back where we 
started from.
With this new constitutional 
convention there is no protection 
for any section of the Constitution or 
any law. The executive can decide to 
ignore any section of the Constitution, 
any law whatever and any order of the 
court, if to do so would be better for 
“peace and stability”. Under the new 
jurisprudence, it seems that justice has 
become an optional extra.
We claim to have free and fair 
elections. In our democracy, ruling 
parties can win and lose elections 
and so governments can change, 
but the constitution and its laws and 
conventions endure. Whichever party 
wins an election, it inherits what the 
previous government leaves. What 
has now happened is that the current 
ANC government has established a 
new constitutional convention: in 
order to preserve what it considers to 
be “peace and stability”, the ruling 
party may disregard any provision of 
the constitution, any enacted law, and 
any order of a court. Sec. 37 of the 
Constitution, which regulates states of 
emergency, would be valueless because 
this itself would have been suspended.
South Africa’s judges, in their 
statement issued on 8 July, said:
The Rule of Law is the cornerstone 
of our constitutional democracy. In 
simple terms it means everybody 
whatever her or his status is subject 
to and bound by the constitution 
and the law. As a nation, we ignore 
it at our peril. Also, the rule of law 
dictates that court orders should be 
obeyed.
The comment by the Gauteng High 
Court was even grimmer:
A democratic State based on the 
rule of law cannot exist or function, 
if the government ignores its 
constitutional obligations and fails to 
abide by Court orders. A Court is the 
guardian of justice, the corner-stone 
of a democratic system based on the 
rule of law. If the State, an organ of 
State	or	State	official	does	not	abide	
by Court orders, the democratic 
edifice	 will	 crumble	 stone-by-stone	
until it collapses and chaos ensues.
Law and politics are intimately linked. 
The Cabinet tried to find arguments 
to justify the release of Al-Bashir, and 
had no intention to comply with the 
Rome Statute. That they knew that 
the law was being shamefully broken 
is evidenced by the words of Lindiwe 
Zulu, quoted above, that Cabinet had 
decided that peace and stability were 
more important than justice.
But this was precisely the 
justification for the atrocities of our 
own past. Can there ever be peace and 
security without justice? The apartheid 
regime claimed that its injustices were 
in the interests of “peace and stability”, 
and “peace and stability” is all that 
Al-Bashir seeks in Sudan. Was there 
ever a “just” genocidaire, or one who 
made no claim to be acting in pursuit 
of “peace and stability”? We are 
entitled to an explanation: when and 
how will those to whom Al-Bashir has 
brought “peace and stability” be given 
justice also?
Lindiwe Zulu said, and other ANC 
speakers endorsed her words, that the 
criticism of the Zuma government’s 
action in the Al-Bashir matter was 
intended to discredit the ANC. 
There is now no barrier to a political 
decision by the government of the 
day that electoral opposition to it is 
intended to discredit it, and that its 
defeat in a general election would 
accordingly endanger “peace and 
stability” in South Africa. Resorting 
to the constitutional convention 
which has now been created, the 
ruling party can now brush aside all 
constitutional laws governing free 
and fair elections and take any action 
it feels is necessary to ensure that it 
remains in power.
Why is this not a quiet coup d'état?
The courts in our democracy 
are not constitutionally required to 
jump to the crack of the executive’s 
whip, whichever party wields it. The 
alternative is a different South Africa 
to the one we fought for and are now 
working to breathe life into. Our peace 
and stability both at home and in our 
international relations are possible only 
with justice and for our constitution to 
be respected meticulously.
Having violated South Africa’s 
international legal commitments, our 
own constitution, and defied an order 
of court, what reason is there to have 
confidence in any claim that the ANC 
government remains committed to the 
rule of law? ■
